How relevant is class analysis to African politics?

In Africa, there exists, in effect, a three-tier bourgeoisie – foreign bourgeoisie, African bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie.  These are then further broken down into sub-classes and make for an extensive list.  This would immediately make one think that the relevance of class analysis in Africa must be high; why all these classes and sub-classes if they are irrelevant?

The answer is quite simple.  If one is trying to define something that is not suited to a certain prescription, one must alter or expand that prescription.  Thus, we see a massive spectrum of classes identified within the African states.  This means that socio-politico researchers and analysts have a label to give a certain demographic, yet it does not necessarily have any ‘true’ meaning or relevance to the actuality of the situation.

The foreign bourgeoisie is generally broken down into two sub-classes; the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the local expatriate class; these sit at the pinnacle of the social hierarchy.  They are, in general, members of the post-colonial elite; either experienced businessmen remaining in Africa to make their millions and exploit the opportunities available to them; or they are educated members of the previous colonial administration, sent to Africa to gain experience on a ‘sabbatical’ post.

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Their transient and insular nature mean that although they have an impact on the economic and social developments of the relevant countries in which they stay, their effects are not necessarily universally accepted or understood.  One of the best examples of this kind of manoeuvring is that of the businessman Rowland Walter Fuhrhop (‘Tiny Rowland’), who was dubbed by the then British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, as the “unacceptable face of capitalism.”

Rowland was one of the first businessmen to befriend the emerging nationalist movements in Africa and disparage colonial rule.  It was widely assumed that he owed his "success" to his willingness to bribe the newly elected post-colonial governments.  When a biography exposed this as his modus operandi, he did not offer to refute it.  He played a key role in brokering the Lancaster House talks of 1979, which settled the political future of Rhodesia and led to the formation of Zimbabwe, in order to secure Lonrho's financial interests.

Rowland was one of the few people who made a large ‘corporate’ impact on the face of African politics.  The lack of a ‘national bourgeoisie’ means that industrialisation has been sporadic and has left Africa bereft of a structured and stable industrial base for foreign investors to get involved in.  

The foreign bourgeoisie should be seen as an ephemeral body of people who come and go as their fortunes change; having no ‘formal’ impact or agenda other than to ensure their own gains.  Hence, in the case of the bourgeoisie, one should simply consider it as a nice label that identifies a set of people well off and powerful enough to maintain their own positions at the expense of others.  Their policy agendas are reactionary to the changing economic and political climate and are designed to perpetuate their own interests.

In a similar manner, the African bourgeoisie are instrumental in their agendas, yet they operate within the state framework and use this to legitimise their actions.

[It] is made up of political leaders, public servants, businessmen, lawyers, doctors and other members of the professions and military officers, all of whom…constitute a ‘managerial bourgeoisie.  While those members of the middle class who are public office-holders have benefited greatly from state expansion, those among them with private interests have often done especially well, not least in contexts when the state itself has been in decline.  In Mobutu’s Zaire…the ‘new middle class’ received preferential access to trade in diamonds, timber and consumer goods ‘through ties to the president, especially as state institutions collapse[d]’.

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The general trend since independence has been for the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to be strong in the immediate to medium term post colonialism and then become weaker as time goes on.  This is partly due to the image that they carried as colonial puppets and partly due to the changing nature of the state; becoming much more personal and informal – relying more heavily of clientelism.

As this occurs many members of the civil service, who make up the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, look elsewhere for sustenance and generally end up in the commercial sector, utilising the networks they have built up during their tenure as civil servants.  At the same time, those in the political bourgeoisie, either during or after their tenure, look to expand their influence, power and wealth into the commercial sector, exploiting similar networks and links.

The commercial sector is concentrated in areas that are of immediate importance and can generate wealth.  Utilising their links with the state and its apparatus, members of the commercial bourgeoisie offer that which is needed most, cutting through red tape where required and creating potential sources of wealth.  Their interests have included agriculture (especially flowers and vegetables for the foreign market), real estate (selling and renting to businesses and embassies as well as exploiting their access to knowledge sources regarding developments and investing accordingly) and communications/infrastructure.

The ability and propensity of the African people to transcend these class boundaries (within the ranks of the bourgeoisie) make it difficult to analyse the importance and accuracy of class models.  This is further exacerbated by the complexity of the social structures of African nations that cannot be easily defined in such two-dimensional terms.

On the next rung down the social strata rests the petty bourgeoisie; petty trading being the main occupation in this demographic, either through street vending or market stalls.  The level of economic exchange here is extremely informal and there is little security for those who are among the petty bourgeoisie.  

These untaxed and unregulated revenues - by some estimates - account for between 40% and 45% of gross domestic product (GDP)…Apart from providing people with work, the black economy is usually the only place people can buy goods they need.

 

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A Lagos-based banker told the BBC's World Business Report: "The customers are the everyday person in Nigeria.  Supermarkets, shopping malls are really not that widespread, so most people shop in the markets."

 

"The informal economy really is the backbone of the Nigerian economy.  It is the backbone because most services that Nigerians require to keep things running come from the informal sector," the Nigerian-based analyst added. 

This makes for a very uneasy existence, in limbo between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, meaning that right-wing ideals become entrenched in this class.  Consequently, they are the most relevant class in terms of political motivation; they can become the ‘foot soldiers of fascism’ when times are hard – they are an important informal force, not to be taken lightly.

Now let us consider the proletariat, again broken down, this time into two, arguably three, sub-classes; the proletariat; the lumpenproletariat and the peasantry.

An identifiable urban proletariat was slow to emerge in Africa…One reason for this slowness was that urban workers retained close social ties with their kinsmen in the rural areas…Moreover, the fact that factional politics penetrated labour organisations and other modern interest groups also militated against the development of class consciousness.  Nevertheless, by the late 1980s urban workers were showing political solidarity as a class and were to play a key role in the pro-democracy movement.

One should note that the level of solidarity and cohesion of this urban proletariat depends greatly on the size and stability of the local economy; where economic conditions are stable, people are able to feel secure in their wage-driven jobs and they feel free enough to become political.  

No state exemplifies this better than South Africa, with its rich mining resources and foreign-aided light/medium industry; it has all the trappings of a modern capitalist state.  These industries breed disposable incomes and the desire for services; giving rise to service sector jobs and a move from a rural emphasis to a more urban-centric way of life.  

In other states, where urban areas offering work for hourly/weekly wages is sparse, this level of politicisation does not exist.  Often, people move to the urban centres looking for work and find that it does not exist.  At this point, they become members of the lumpenproletariat; the lowest level of the proletariat, comprising unskilled workers, the unemployed, and the dispossessed, alienated from the class with which they would normally identify and having little or no class solidarity.

Finally, let us consider the peasantry, the largest class in African states.  Being most susceptable to the informal client-patron relations that pervade African politics these self-subsistence dwellers are often exploited by the urban elites, through the use of marketing moards and price fixing.

Most African rural economies were not based on plantation agriculture and the great majority of the people lived in scattered homesteads or in small villages, with poor communications linking the various communities.  The peasantry was divided…with a low level of class development and consciousness.

Therefore, the peasantry, although potentially a powerful force in a democratic arena lack the cohesion and resources to unite and form a pseudo-rural proletariat and become a political force.  No class of people highlight how irrelevant class analysis is to African politics than the peasantry – these people lack anything that would make class a useful identifier; although they all, necessarily, by definition, share a comon identity, their emphasis on the economy of affection negates any realisation of ideals that transcend clan identifiers.

The proletariat have lacked a massive wave of industrialisation which allows them to become a collective political voice (through Trade Unions).  This is only contradicted by South Africa which has seen an extensive rise in industrialisation and unionisation.  However, despitr this, their still remain informal relations within the system; some Trade Union leaders exploiting their positions and moving into the commercial bourgeoisie through their links with industry.

The mobilisation of the lumpenproletariat and peasantry remains virtually impossible.  The make-up of both prevents a true sense of collective consciousness.  The tenets of ethnicity conflict with the sense of community and collectivity espoused by class consciousness.  This is something that the bourgeoisie recognise and often exploit; utilising teir informal influences to propagate these beliefs and maintain an ignorance to the class consciousness.

In summation, we have seen how the indigenous and expatriate elites utilise their monopoly on the means of production and political power to maintain and further their positions within society.  

We have seen how the lumpenproletariat have become the most formally structured of the classes.  We can see that they are potentially a powerful political force; having a class consciousness, to a greater or lesser extent, and having the potential to become a politicised force.  The bourgeoisie act independently of them; becoming mindful of their presence and importance when times are hard.

The hopelessness of the position of the proletariat classes has been made evident too; highlighting that they exist in a state of false consciousness, being occupied with ideas of kinship, ethnicity and other such distractions.

To analyse an area on means and access to production is useful and can give worthwhile results, however, it relies on a level of production that necessitates large levels of industrialisation.  As such, for the majority of Africa (South Africa excepted) class analysis falls short of offering anything other than an interesting reference point from which to start other analyses.

Therefore, in conclusion, we can state that class analysis is relevant in African politics in so far as it seems to fit the orthodox Marxist-Leninist model of strata.  These strata display classic characteristics of conditions and identity, yet the composition of these classes and the informal structure of the state means that this is the extent to which class analysis is useful.

Its informal structures of clientelism and black marketeering make it difficult to examine in such a way.  On top of this lies the community problem; class transcends gender, religion, ethnicity and geography – it is absolute.  Africa is, absolutely, not ready for such a movement.

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Bibliography

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Hague & Harrop Comparative Government & Politics: An Introduction (5th Ed).  Basingstoke: Palgrave (2001)

A. Heywood Politics (2nd Ed).  Basingstoke: Palgrave (1997; 2002)

W. Tordoff African Government & Politics (4th Ed) London: Palgrave (2001)        

Other Resources

JStor.  http://uk.jstor.org/jstor/index.shtml [16/02/2004]

Social Science Research Council Papers 

The Unfulfilled Promise of African Industrialization 

Lynn Krieger Mytelka

African Studies Review, Vol. 32, No. 3. (Dec., 1989), pp. 77-137.

The Communist League (Britain).  http://mltranslations.org/Britain/Marxclass.htm [16/02/2004]

The University of Wisconsin Sociology Department – Prof E.O. Wright’s Homepage.  http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright [16/02/2004]

World Socialist Web Site.http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/july1998/rowl-j29.shtml [16/02/2004]

BBC Business News.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1689165.stm [02/02/04]

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