Is nuclear deterrence a viable strategy in the post-cold war period?

The question refers to the concept of deterrence. Non-nuclear or conventional deterrence has existed for many centuries. It usually involves an attempt by one state to influence the policies and decisions of another by using the threat of punishment or denial. That is, either by destroying assets that a state highly values, or by preventing a state from achieving its objectives, respectively. (Payne and Walton, 2002 p161-162) However, previous to the invention of nuclear weapons, it was not such a prominent strategy since conventional force was not a large enough threat and could often be ignored. It also involved risks for the deterring power since they would have to send forces to the enemy state. Nuclear deterrence, as referred to in the question is most closely associated with strategy during the cold war. It uses the same basic logic as conventional deterrence but it is much more effective.

Before responding directly to the question it is important to explain and outline the crucial part that nuclear deterrence played until the end of the cold war. This will provide the context against which its present situation can be compared. Examples from the last decade will be used in order to analyse whether and when nuclear deterrence strategy played a part within them. Arguments from either side of the debate will accompany these examples. The arguments which provide the most persuasive account on the position of deterrence strategy in the world today will be favoured in the conclusion.

Some would argue that nuclear deterrence was the single reason, which prevented the cold war from turning hot. When the bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, most observers thought they were witnessing a new means for warfare. It was seen, by policy makers, in a similar light to the introduction of air power. However, one American observer, Bernard Brodie, was quick to note that ‘thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on it must be to avert them.’(Brodie, 1946, p69) This comment in some respects summed up the cold war. The Americans wanted to protect the world from Soviet domination and to contain communism as much as possible. Nuclear deterrence provided the solution. It would make American aims possible without the risk of military, political and financial costs. Until 1949 the American monopoly of nuclear weapons made it possible for them to deter the soviets when finally the Soviets tested their first nuclear device. When both superpowers were finally matched in numbers of nuclear weapons in 1969, deterrence played its most important role within the condition of Mutually Assured Destruction. Each side was deterred from launching nuclear weapons because both superpowers would be mutually threatened by a retaliatory strike. A nuclear war could have resulted in the destruction of both superpowers. Thus the cold war ended without the use of any nuclear weapons thanks to nuclear deterrence.

The end of the cold war was a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This led to great changes in world politics. Many thought that with the end of the cold war it would also mean an end of nuclear deterrence as a central strategy in maintaining world order and stability. Others saw it as a strategy that had been linked with nuclear weapons rather than the cold war and suggested that it would retain its importance as long as nuclear weapons played a significant role in world politics. Both these voices are still with us. Since ...

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Over the last decade the politics of the world has evolved towards a multilateral power system. The powers are not matched as well as the U.S. and the Soviet Union were, since America remains the only real superpower. In terms of the powers with relative influence within the world, the UK, France, Russia, Germany, Japan and China could be grouped together loosely. Throughout the 1990’s non-proliferation has played a major role within the world. The previous nuclear powers, especially America, have expressed concern over the spread of WMD’s to the developing world. The most important Post-cold-war problems through American eyes have been the following events: (1) The continuation of a nuclear weapons programme in North Korea. 2) Chinese economic political and strategic changes 3) Evolution of Russian domestic politics. 4) Proliferation of Weapons of mass destruction. 5) Tensions in the Middle East (Butfoy, 1999 pp150-166) and finally the rise in terrorism especially since the start of the 21st century. Some of these issues may involve deterrence. To respond positively to the question, and thus to prove that deterrence is a viable strategy today it will be necessary to look at basic deterrence theory. By applying this to the world today it can be evaluated whether it is in use and if so, whether it has a different character from the nuclear deterrence of the cold war.

The theorists who argue in support of deterrence see it in a positive light. They would argue that it offers security and has the ability to prevent all major wars. They would therefore support proliferation of nuclear weapons. Most theorists with such a perspective lie within the realist school of international relations. Kenneth Waltz, a major neo-realist theorist, supports proliferation, as explained in his monograph of 1981. Within it he suggests that Nuclear weapons provide invulnerability to insecure states via deterrence. (Waltz, 1981) An example to support this would be Israel in the Middle East. It receives much antagonism from its neighbours and has previously fought wars to maintain its disputed territory. It is well known by its surrounding Arab states that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. It is often therefore argued that Israel deters an invasion simply by its monopoly of the bomb within that region. Some have analysed the case further and point out that Israel initially uses deterrence via threats but also via inflicting punishment using conventional weapons. This restores deterrence and proves that it may be more than just an empty threat. (Inbar and Sandler, 1995)

A second example, which may clarify the existence of deterrence, would be the frictional states of Pakistan and India. Many would argue that they are witnessing a nuclear arms race similar, but on a smaller scale, to the race between the superpowers in the cold war. Both states have tested nuclear weapons. The world, especially the west, fears that deterrence will fail due to the lack of sophistication, which was indeed present during the cold war. It is suggested by many scholars that these states lack strategies and postures that are required for deterrence to work. (Chellany, 1994) The Indian and Pakistani leaders feel they are being patronised by the west. The Indian general Sundarji argues that ‘there is no alternative to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles if you are to live in security and with honour. (Sundarji 1996 p193) What worries most scholars is that when they look to the cold war they are given examples of mistakes and misjudgements, which at times led to the brink of war. The best way to analyse whether deterrence has worked in this case is to look at the last few years of the hostility between India and Pakistan over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Freedman notes that at the end of 2002 General Musharraf, the Pakistani leader, claimed that he had reiterated and reminded Prime Minister Vajpayee of India that if Indian forces crossed the international border, India could not expect a conventional war. (Freedman 2002) In this way, the Pakistani general was clearly aiming at deterring India from any form of warfare. Some months later, General Musharraf claimed that Pakistan had secured a victory without a war due to the withdrawal of Indian forces from the disputed border. It is a clear sign of deterrence being used as a successful strategy for Pakistan.

A final aspect of contemporary deterrence is the concept of virtual nuclear arsenals. In our present world there is a great taboo against any mention of WMD’s. Treaties such as START II and NPT are in place in order to promote non-proliferation. By owning nuclear weapons a state may draw much attention towards itself and the weapons may have the opposite effects to the ones desired. The Non-Proliferation Treaty clarifies in Article II that non-nuclear states are ‘not to manufacture…. nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’. This however in no way prohibits having knowledge or researching on Nuclear weapons. Thus modern day deterrence may not even require the ownership of any nuclear devices. By having the knowledge and ability to manufacture weapons, a state may deter its enemies by announcing its capabilities but keeping an ambiguity about anything physical. (Cohen and Pilat, 1998) There are several examples to support this. Firstly it is important to notice that there are only around seven declared nuclear weapons states. Then there exist the threshold nuclear weapon states of which there is an amount of uncertainty. Most scholars would firmly place North Korea and Iran within this category. Taking North Korea as a state with nuclear weapons knowledge and capability, it may be suggested that the state has deterred interventions by America on several occasions. Weber points out that ‘military interventions against states that possess even a small number of nuclear weapons will be vanishingly rare.’(Weber, 1992, p208) America believes that North Korea has Nuclear weapons and so their policy will always be to avoid the state and they are therefore being deterred. From the Korean angle, they may not actually possess any physical weapons. However, by behaving in a manner that suggests the opposite they could fool the Americans without spending any of their defence budget on the expense of building weapons. It seems contemporary deterrence is not only a viable strategy, but that it is far cheaper than the classic deterrence of the cold war.

Many strategic scholars have noted that those in favour of deterrence today, shape their arguments solely on examples of dubious nuclear states which have only emerged recently and mostly in the East. Since nuclear deterrence was initially a western concept it is argued by many that it is only the states of the west that can have the knowledge in order to use it as a part of their strategy. Morgan is a critic of the existence of deterrence. He feels that it should be analysed from where the theory left off at the end of the cold war. The first point of concern should be amongst the previous superpowers. Morgan begins his analysis by using Freedman’s conclusion on western deterrence that ‘from dominating western strategic thinking, it now appears confined to the margins’. (Freedman, 97) Morgan supports this by reminding us that the nuclear arsenals of the America and Russia are well in reserve. American concerns about Russia after the cold war should be put aside due to the fact that Russia didn’t just quit, but moved to embrace the fundamental elements of the west. Hence for Russia, deterrence can be relegated to the periphery of security affairs. (Morgan 2003, p250) Also less salient is the concept of extended deterrence practised in the cold war, whereby America would threaten the use of nuclear weapons if any state were to attempt invading its European allies. This has largely been the result of the lack of a threat to the ‘freedom’ of the world in the form of a state. It is true to say that terrorism can be described in a sense as the new communism but since it is usually carried out by a sub-state group, it would be very difficult to deter. The scholars arguing for the extinction of deterrence tend to separate nuclear weapons from nuclear deterrence. Morgan does not deny the widespread proliferation of weapons but argues that deterrence is context dependent. A lack of a situation similar to the cold war means that the current security focus for the great powers is not deterring war, but rather management of great-power relations so war-threatening conflicts do not arise, leaving deterrence as unnecessary. (Morgan 2003, p250)

A final and evaluative argument reminds us that the new wave of democratisation washes away the need for deterrence. The argument is based upon the democratic peace theory, which suggests that democracies will not wage war on each other, as has been the case for the last 50 years. Deterrence could be summed up as a response to the communist ideology. As more and more countries become democratic it creates security via homogeneity. Democracies also promote wealth and progress and all this combines to eradicate the security dilemma leading the way for disarmament. (Clark 2001 p167-192)

Both sets of arguments use examples from the world today to prove whether nuclear deterrence still plays a part as a viable strategy in post cold war policies. However, since the turn of the century there have been great changes within the world. Many arguments made by scholars in the early 90’s are proved wrong by time and others are strengthened. What can clearly be concluded from the arguments is that if deterrence still exists, it is more prominent in the states of the east. It is clear that deterrence on the scale of the cold war has not shown up again, maybe due to the lack of another superpower to compete with American hegemony. From observing Asia and the Middle East, it is clear that over the last decade many wars have been prevented, by what the leaders of the states term ‘nuclear deterrence’. In the west those arguing for its disappearance still admit that American reserves prove that although de-emphasised, deterrence is not yet delegitimized. Also, it seems America professes to be so seriously threatened by what it terms ‘rogue states’ that it needs to be able to fall back on nuclear weapons despite its military superiority. (Morgan, 2003 p251) From analysis of both the arguments and the world today, it is quite evident that nuclear deterrence strategy has spread in some form throughout the world and as the states in the east learn more, the west is forced to cling on for fear of insecurity.

Bibliography:

Payne and Walton in Baylis et al (2002) Strategy in the contemporary world, (Oxford: Oxford university press)

Brodie Bernard (1946) The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World

(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co)

Butfoy A (1999) ‘The future of nuclear strategy’ in Contemporary Security and Strategy (Macmillan press LTD)

Waltz (1981) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers, Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981)

Inbar and Sandler, Middle Eastern Security: Prospects for an Arms Control Regime, (London: Frank Cass & Co. 1995)

General K. Sundarji (1996) India's Nuclear Weapons Policy

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Cohen and Pilat ‘Assessing virtual nuclear Arsenals’ Survival journal 40/1998 (p129-144)