- Capability. The deterring State must have the capability to inflict enough damage to be deemed an unacceptably high price to pay on any aggressor state in the case of a first strike
- Will. The deterring state must show a willingness to use overwhelming force if the need ever arose, and not itself be deterred
- Communication. The deterring state must have successfully communicated points 1 and 2 to the aggressor state
- Credibility. The deterring state must be believed when it says it will carry out its threats if needs be
Nuclear deterrence began the “balance of terror” between the nuclear-armed super powers. Total annihilation had been supposedly adverted by a doctrine that came to be known as mutually assured destruction, MAD for short. MAD was to become the central theme of American defence planning for over 30 years. By effectively holding each other’s cities hostages to the prospect of complete destruction neither one nuclear-armed state would initiate a first strike knowing that it would mean a retaliatory strike of equal or similar proportions, “whoever shoots first, dies second”. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence was seen as a solid barrier to any would be aggressors, this however was not to be the case.
Deterrence may have temporarily prevented the two super powers from destroying the world’s civilisations but it may also have in fact led to a period of increased conventional warfare. In attempts not to face each other in warfare directly the United States and Soviet Union engaged in a series of incredibly bloody proxy wars using a third party to do the fighting and dying. One such example was the war in Angola. There, Soviet armed Cubans fought against the Angolan government led by the MPLA to counter CIA efforts to help UNITA topple the government. War via proxy became a perfect way for the two giants of the cold war to trade blows without compromising the security of the homeland, and became common practice throughout the cold war.
As I have stated earlier deterrence was in theory supposed to advert warfare of all forms, even at it’s most basic between nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear armed states. This has not been the case however as wars have been fought between the Chinese and U.S in Korea, Afghan rebels against the Soviets in Afghanistan and Argentina against the U.K in the Falklands. The presence of nuclear weapons in the superpowers arsenals furthermore has not prevented them from having to intervene in other countries, as the Soviets have intervened in conflicts in Czechoslovakia, Hungry and Afghanistan, while the U.S has intervened in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Vietnam.
Wars were obviously still being fought even with the advent of the nuclear deterrence doctrine. Ronald Reagan stated in an address to the United States public in 1983, “This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still works”. By one estimate 125 million people have died in 149 wars since 1945, if deterrence was working than there is not a large amount of evidence to substantiate his claims.
Nuclear deterrence may not have prevented general conventional warfare, though deterrence is claimed to work because it has supposedly prevented any large-scale nuclear war. Is the absence of a nuclear war sufficient reason to claim that deterrence actually works? In the opinion of at least one author it is not. According to Holmes nuclear deterrence has clearly failed as soon as one side has began to seriously consider launching a first strike. It is a well-known fact that both the U.S and USSR have on more than one occasion come within minutes of launching a first strike i.e., the Cuban missile crisis. It could therefore be concluded that deterrence is failing.
Lets assume that the absence of a nuclear war is proof enough that deterrence is working. Who’s to say it will continue to work in the future. The posture of nuclear deterrence is one of constant alert and fear. As soon as the fear by one deterring state is made real enough to tip the balance of deterrence a first strike could, (and according to deterrence doctrine, should) be instantly launched even if the fear is completely unjustified. According to Holmes only an optimist would believe that deterrence strategy could be maintained indefinitely without disaster.
Deterrence doctrines in addition merely covers one of the ways in which a nuclear war might start, namely by a deliberate first strike by another state. Wars today are increasingly being fought against non-state actors such as terrorist groups and rebellions. To exert effective deterrence a state will first of all need an enemy with territory, preferably a sovereign one, with a government who will be susceptible to political pressure. Whatever the policies are, “deterrence depends on influencing the decisions of other governments”, and therefore terrorist organizations are immune to deterrence doctrine.
Deterrence doctrine in itself is a creator of heightened tensions and near conflict. It is the deterrence doctrine that leads to massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons, as each deterring state tries to gain parity with the other. As the stockpiles of a nuclear-armed state raise so do the risks of war as any opposing state becomes increasingly provoked. It is estimated that there are currently 31,000 nuclear weapons deployed in reserves in eight different countries throughout the world, why is there a need for so many devastating weapons if they are never to be used?
Nuclear deterrence doctrine is by no means perfect. It is a doctrine of irrational ideas founded on the principal of, “threatening the unthinkable to stop the unthinkable”. It has not only failed to prevent world conflict, but also fuelled increased tensions and possibly brought the world closer to war. As I have discussed its one saving grace might be the fact that as of yet the world has been free from a nuclear conflict. However to use this fact as a measure for the success of this doctrine could indeed prove fatal. The very fact that the world has been on the brink of nuclear war so many times proves that deterrence has either failed already or is at the least too dangerous to trust to the fate of civilisation to.
Nuclear age peace foundation, Nuclear strategies, Doctrines and concepts, , (20/5/05)
Nuclear age peace foundation, Nuclear strategies, Doctrines and concepts, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/kinuclearweapons/strat_deterrence.html, (20/5/05)
Robert L. Holmes, On War & Morality, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.369
Alan J. Parrington, Aerospace power journal, Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited, , (20/5/05)
Nuclear age peace foundation, MAD, , (20/5/05)
7 Pierre Beaudet, Africa Files, War & Peace & War: Angola: War without End, , (20/5/05)
Robert L. Holmes, On War & Morality, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.215
Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation, March 23, 1983
Alan J. Parrington, Aerospace power journal, Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited, , (20/5/05)
Robert L. Holmes, On War & Morality, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.247
Jscope, Epistemology of Nuclear deterrence in a post-Cold War world, , (24/5/05)
Robert L. Holmes, On War & Morality, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.346
W. H Baugh, The Politics of Nuclear Balance, p.37
General L. Butler, Resurgence 193, Death by Deterrence, , (21/5/05)
Nuclear age peace foundation, Nuclear strategies, Doctrines and concepts, http://www.nuclearfiles.org/kinuclearweapons/strat_deterrence.html, (20/5/05)
Robert L. Holmes, On War & Morality, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989, p.216