Rousseau's views on authority and freedom and their implications for modern democracy.
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cpea051 (student)
Rousseau aims at designing a political system so as to reconcile the following two facts:
. That each member of the society is subject to the authority of the state, which authority he/she is required to obey.
2. The fact that human beings are, when they are true to their humanity, free.
Do you think he succeeds? Why or why not, and what implications does your answer have for modern democratic practice?
Introduction
In Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg address he said, “Government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.[1]” This phrase reflects in essence Rousseau’s solution of a polity not overwhelmed by amour-propre, a structure in which people are themselves sovereign without the presence of self-interests[2]. Yet both the general will and positive freedoms are important examples of totalitarianism. I argue Rousseau does not succeed in reconciling authority and freedom; but his work has important implications on modern democratic practices that aim to balance both negative and positive freedoms. Rousseau error in his arguments as a successful relationship between the two concepts should not solely depend on general will and positive freedom.
Rousseau’s reconciliation
According to Rousseau, the general-will dedicates authority to the state. Since everyone contributes towards shaping it, the general-will is always to the advantage of the polity[3]. This concept involves transformation of each individual into part of a greater whole. In other words the clauses for establishing this authority is “a total alienation of rights,” as this allows the terms of the contract to be equal to all[4]. The legislature determines a plan best for the people in which “persuades without convincing” the people as a community what to vote on[5]. Through this no one is dependent on the will of another and are no more than obeying themselves.
To be free when obeying this authority Rousseau redefines freedom, binding it to the contract and general-will, a conception of law governing the polity. When Rousseau claims dissenting people are “forced to be free”, he justifies it through the same contract that the general-will is absolute. Rather than the natural freedom (negative freedom) that dissipates when entering society, the general-will transpires the possibility of positive freedom (civil and moral freedom) [6]. Rousseau substitutes instinct (natural freedom) for justice and gives action a moral quality that they previously lack[7]. Driven by appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to the law that one prescribes to oneself is freedom[8]. In a way, he legitimizes his polity, reconciling the idea of authority and freedom. People are free because they are guided to their true humanity and since the subject and architect of liberty is ones real self instead of others.
Rousseau’s mistake
However, general-will and authority are based on particular assumptions. One of which is justifying the search of truth through majoritarian decisions portrayed in Condorcet’s theorem; the greater absolute truth in majority decision is exponentially increased only if the correctness of each voter is greater than a half[9]. How true is that in modern society, when we are faced with no absolute answer and our decisions are influenced by what we experience? On many issues, what is considered “the general-will” can be challenged as an individual interest. For instance, if the threshold for MMP is lowered ...
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Rousseau’s mistake
However, general-will and authority are based on particular assumptions. One of which is justifying the search of truth through majoritarian decisions portrayed in Condorcet’s theorem; the greater absolute truth in majority decision is exponentially increased only if the correctness of each voter is greater than a half[9]. How true is that in modern society, when we are faced with no absolute answer and our decisions are influenced by what we experience? On many issues, what is considered “the general-will” can be challenged as an individual interest. For instance, if the threshold for MMP is lowered this increases proportionality. However it risks a fragmented parliament that reduces efficiency. Would the “common good” be a more proportionate representation or an effective functional government? What happens if the correctness of each voter is less than half? Similarly, what is the “absolute truth”?
Unsuccessful Reconciliation
Freedom and authority conflicts when the concepts of general-will are not in its best course of action, this is especially true if the general will is the exponent of incorrectness. Berlin argues, firstly the legislator is given a blank slate to work on “anything” that is best for the people to vote on, while dissidents are “forced to be free”[10]. People are always influenced by their surroundings and a true independent decision may not transpire the “common good”. These justifications increases the exponent of incorrectness that conjures an authority vulnerable to abuse and totalitarianism, giving rise to atrocities such as the “final solution” most famously used by the Nazis to exterminate Jews[11].
Similarly there are no reasons to believe the legislator can reconcile the diverse goals of modern reality; there is no absolute “right”[12]. A true best final solution has yet been found, and is certainly not easily achieved if diversity of opinions are not allowed simply because people are forced to be free[13]. Negative freedom (natural freedom) is needed to give people diversity and the ability to choose for themselves the best course rather than being forced into one[14]. Certainly I believe Rousseau would differ in this. Berlin’s assumption considers humans as rationale beings whereas Rousseau emphasizes that unlike gods, humans individually are unable to rationalize what is best for them; hence they need a legislature to guide the general will.
Mill on the other hand suggests the only purpose for which force can be rightfully exercised on an individual is to prevent harm to others, dissimilar to the assumption of forcing the general-will[15]. Equality is the recognition of differences (fairness) instead of equal treatment[16]. Only with diversity, the checks and balances against tyranny of majority can be possible. Likewise people have to be respected equally for pursing different goals (negative freedom) instead of forced into a generalized framework.
Rousseau’s argument is circular, the conformity of particular will into “the general-will” establish positive freedom, similarly positive freedom necessitates bringing particular will into conformity with the general will. He overlooks the importance of negative freedom and its contribution to equality by allowing the legislature to set a framework for the people. Moreover he disregards the fact that a decisions made by the people may not produce an absolute truth. Rousseau’s argument circulates around solely on developing positive freedom dependent upon an “unbiased” legislature and general-will instead of rationality. He does not succeed in reconciling the two facts because “forcing people to be free” raises questions about political legitimacy that rests on conformity rather than reason.
Important Implications
Nonetheless it is important to note a distinction between majoritarian rule and the general-will. Rousseau’s objective of a general-will is not merely about majority interest but rather of political morality, “to preserve the people in spirit of its original institutions”[17]. Instead of consent or will of a kind, the general-will in essence is a form of political education that promotes a sense of common good[18]. This brings to life the concept of a “model citizen” that takes an active role in the manufacturing law of the community. Budge further illustrates, that technological progress has extensively aided democratic activities as voices can be projected more efficiently[19]. Through the sharing of opinions, the general-will is essentially the “sum of differences” rather than the will of majority. For example, in principle if people were to vote on the use of death penalty, they would suggest it not to be imposed on minor offences such as speeding, because these rules apply to them equally[20].
This implies in modern democratic practices, Rousseau’s general-will can encompass a constitutional framework whereby laws are guided accordingly to it[21]. To an extent it is true, society can only exist if people live within a framework of laws that they agree and adhere to. There is certainly some truth in Rousseau’s claims. Nonetheless it is also important to note there are always trade-offs in democratic practices and a constant balance between positive and negative freedom. For Rousseau, the “alienation of rights” seeks to achieve greater transparency from the government by restricting the establishment to only perform tasks that’s “for the people” (positive freedom)[22]. However it is essential for the governments to function with self-determination (negative freedom); for instance in concealing important information to prevent security threats.
Independence is essential, as people should not be governed by a particular will[23]. However no one knows the absolute truth to an answer. There are no certainties in a precise formula for positive freedom; restrictions should be justified by reason instead of vindicating it towards an absolute truth. People should be allowed to explore their choices, put to use the expertise of their representatives, while at the same time given the ability to constrain the operations of electoral decision-making by means of constitutional devices[24]. Too much negative freedom will lead to chaos. Equally positive freedom is easily fallible in the wrong hands. Modern democratic practices should aim to balance positive and negative freedom in order to respect diversity and differences essential in cultivating a legit authority that allows the people to be “free”. There should be no assumptions that the general-will is always right; instead democratic practices should focus on moral autonomy and commitment.
References
Berlin, Isaiah. Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 134-135.
Budge, I. The New Challenges of Direct Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 158.
Cherniss, J., & Hardy, H. “Isaiah Berlin,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/berlin/ (accessed September 05, 2012)
Constitution Society, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract,” Constitution Society, http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm. (accessed September 8, 2012).
Estlund, D. M., Waldron, J., Grofman, B., & Feld S. L. “Democratic theory and the Public interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited,” American Political Science Review 83, no. 4 (1989): 1324.
Held, David. Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Stanford University Press, 1996), 79-82.
Inston, Kevin. “Representing the unrepresentable: Rousseau’s legislator and the impossible object of the people,” Contemporary Political Theory 9, (2010): 393.
Lewis, H. D. “Freedom and Authority in Rousseau,” Cambridge University Press 53, no. 205 (1976): 356.
Project Gutenberg, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Emile,” Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5427/pg5427.html. (accessed September 8, 2012).
Putterman, Ethan. Rousseau, Law and the Sovereignty of the People (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 77.
Weale, Albert. Democracy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 35.
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[1] Library of Congress, “Nicolay Copy of Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysberg Address,” Library of Congress, http://myloc.gov/Exhibitions/GettysburgAddress/exhibitionitems/ExhibitObjects/NicolayCopy.aspx. (accessed September 8, 2012).
[2] amour proper; the sense of self derived from others as opposed to individual authenticity. Project Gutenberg, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Emile,” Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/5427/pg5427.html. (accessed September 8, 2012).
[3] Constitution Society, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Social Contract,” Constitution Society, http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm. (accessed September 8, 2012).
[4] Ibid.,
[5] Ibid.,
[6] Returning to natural freedom is unfeasible; the right of unlimited rights is impractical once people enter into society. The capacity of any individual to get what he/she wants is limited and compelled by the capacity of others Ibid.,
[7] Civil freedom transpires as individuals are guaranteed a sphere of equal freedom under the law. Moral freedom is attained when we are participants to the law that we obey. This is the point where we are true to our humanity, free.
[8] Ibid.,
[9] David M. Estlund, Jeremy Waldron, Bernard Grofman, Scott L. Feld, “Democratic theory and the Public interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited,” American Political Science Review 83, no. 4 (1989): 1324.
[10] Joshua Cherniss & Henry Hardy, “Isaiah Berlin,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/berlin/ (accessed September 05, 2012)
[11] Isaiah Berlin, Freedom and Its Betrayal: Six Enemies of Human Liberty (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 134-135.
[12] Kevin Inston, “Representing the unrepresentable: Rousseau’s legislator and the impossible object of the people,” Contemporary Political Theory 9, (2010): 393.
[13] Berlin, 158.
[14] Ibid.,
[15] David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Stanford University Press, 1996), 79-82.
[16] Ibid.,
[17] Ethan Putterman, Rousseau, Law and the Sovereignty of the People (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 77.
[18] Ibid.,
[19] I. Budge, The New Challenges of Direct Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 158.
[20] Albert Weale, Democracy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 35.
[21] Ibid., 40-41.
[22] H. D. Lewis, “Freedom and Authority in Rousseau,” Cambridge University Press 53, no. 205 (1976): 356.
[23] Ibid.,
[24] Weale, 42.
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cpea051 (student)
