Those in parliament did not perceive the working masses to be a viable opposition and therefore a combination of force and repressive legislation was introduced by the government. The closing down of associations deemed too threatening to the security of the union such as the Spencewan Societies and the implementation of the ‘Six Acts’ quashed potential uprising. The Peterloo massacre in August 1819 was an example of how the government crushed a potential rebellion, which resulted in 11 civilian deaths after Henry ‘Orator’ Hunt led a crowd of 60,000 in St Peter’s Fields, Manchester. The government justified the action by claiming that the security of various Cabinet ministers was in jeopardy, after the Cato Street Conspiracy in 1820 and that those protesting against the government were threatening the state. The progress made by those advocating reform outside and inside of Westminster was therefore hindered because of the alleged threat to the security of the nation and the fact that the movement did not have the widespread support of the middle classes, which led the government to simply dismiss the validity of the groups demanding reform. The suspension of Habeas Corpus in 1794 shows that the government genuinely feared the threat posed by the masses, but repressive action was taken by the government, rather than action which would support the claim that public pressure was the most significant factor in accounting for reform. It could therefore be argued that public pressure actually impeded progress for reform at several stages in the century because of government reaction to the pressure.
The alliance between the middle and working classes hit its peak in the 1830’s, and the creation of the Birmingham Political Union by Thomas Attwood in 1829 placed greater pressure on the government than ever before, especially in light of the French Revolution in 1830. ‘Swing Riots’ broke out in August 1830, which worried MP’s because it showed that the masses were not afraid to target leading authoritative figures. The Whig government that proposed the reform bill in 1832 emphasised the threat of revolution prevalent in the country in order to ensure the support of the Lords and the monarch in passing the bill as both had refused to back previous proposals for reform. As Earl Grey, Whig Prime Minister at the time proposed, ‘The measure must be large enough to satisfy public opinion, and to afford sure ground of resistance to further innovation’. Public pressure did therefore play a role in the passing of the Great Reform Act, but the campaign had been going for 50 years and the legislation itself did little to change the system of representation in the UK because the reformist measure was simply to prevent revolution and not meet the demands of the public. Popular pressure for reforming parliament was at its peak surrounding the 1832 Reform Act but one could question how real or direct the threat of rebellion was as can be seen by Earl Grey’s comments, stating that resistance to further innovation, rather than succumbing to public pressure was the reason why the Act was passed. One reason why public pressure did not succeed in its objectives was the fact that those pushing for reform divided into factionalist groups, all arguing for different entities. A more united front would presumably have aided the cause of the working classes pushing for reform, but the government could single out groups and show them to be nothing more than self-perpetuating interest groups.
The National Charter Association produced a petition in 1838, which stated six principles they wanted a reform Act to include and this was used as the basis of the aims of the Chartists. Support was widespread for the Chartist movement between 1838 and the 1850’s, as can be seen when 3,000 armed colliers and ironworkers marched on Newport, in protest against the suppressive nature of the system of representation and this protest resulted in two dozen Chartists being killed by soldiers and John Frost, the leader of the event sent to Australia for 17 years. Between June 1839 and June 1940, 500 Chartists were arrested and the membership of the organisation reached around 50,000 in 1842. However, this public pressure achieved little in the way of stimulating legislation to reform parliament and Eric J Evans suggests that ‘The threat posed by Chartism delayed parliamentary consideration of adjustments to the franchise and distribution of seats’.
Although the Chartist movement achieved little, public opinion for reform did not vanish because the system of representation left under the 1832 Reform Act did not satisfy those demanding reform. This can be seen by the fact that riots took place throughout the country in 1866, with notable ones being those in Birmingham, Bristol, Norwich and Hyde Park. These clear signs of public disillusionment with the current system concerned those in Parliament and although there was no threat of revolution, an entity which was sweeping through Europe, Disraeli and Derby did take into consideration outside pressures placed upon them when passing the second Reform Act. The Reform Union and Reform League were set up in 1864 and 1865 respectively to press for franchise changes and as the Reform League had the backing of wealthy middle class individuals, parliament had to take note of its demands.
Popular pressure however did not determine the progress of the campaign for reform and only in conjunction with other elements was reform successful. Before 1832, there was a great deal of public support for reform yet not even the slightest of movements was taken towards reforming parliament. This was due to the fact that complementary factors such as support of the middle classes and the fear of revolution were not apparent, which were needed to aid the plight of the calls for reform in order to succeed. Popular pressure was hardly a factor to consider in why the 1884 Franchise Act and 1885 Redistribution Act were incorporated into the UK constitution, showing that other factors than that of popular pressure were instrumental in accounting for why reforms were made.
As the electorate expanded and political consciousness grew in working areas, ‘respectable’ working class party politics had an increasingly important role to play as time progressed over the plight of parliamentary reform. A demoralised Conservative party took up the issue of parliamentary reform in 1867 as the party and especially its leader, Derby, saw it as a way of raising morale both at Westminster and in the constituencies. The Conservative government was in the minority in the House and Commons and as Derby states, taking up the cause for electoral reform would allow the government to ‘convert, if possible, an existing minority into a practical majority…the agitation for which was standing in the way of…practical legislation.’ The thinking behind the bill was that the Conservatives could overturn the inbuilt Liberal bias of the existing system which had come about as a result of the Whigs gaining power in 1830 after a long period in opposition. This does not mean that popular pressure wasn’t a factor to consider in why the second reform Act was passed, but it shows that party politics was the key factor in determining why the bill was passed. ‘Dishing the Liberals’ was therefore more important than public pressure on the government to reform. The 1885 Redistribution Act was also influenced more so by the need for a political party, this time the Whigs, to increase their power base and reverse the advantage given to the Conservatives by the 1867 Reform Act. Reform can be seen to be a political platform because if a party extends the franchise to the working classes, those who have been incorporated into the franchise will be more inclined to vote for the party which gave them the vote. Popular pressure therefore was not the most important factor considered by those in control of the legislative process when reforming parliament and it could be argued that political advantages to be gained from extending the franchise was the overriding factor.
The threat of revolution and the principle of ‘reform to preserve’, first put forward by McCauley in 1831 also had a role to play in determining why reform legislation was passed. No architect of any of the reform acts suggested by its implementation that the ruling classes should cease to rule, but an element of reform should occur to simply to ensure that the nature of rule was not altered to a great degree. Although popular pressure served to justify fears of revolution similar to that in Europe, it would not necessarily create the atmosphere in which an extent of reform was deemed wise. The fear of the UK facing rebellion and potential revolution was not apparent in certain time periods such as that from 1810-1820 and the government therefore felt they had the ability to introduce repressive legislation in order to dampen any potential uprisings. The 1867 Reform Act extended the franchise to allow more working and middle class families the right to vote, and this would promote class harmony and thus weaken the threat of revolution, showing that those in parliament could manipulate circumstances dependent on the extent to which a revolution was imminent.
Popular pressure was certainly one of many reasons which accounted for why reformist measures were passed through parliament between 1780-1885 because without social unrest, the landed elite within parliament would not have reformed the composition of parliament because that would reduce their position in society. Only under the threat of public rebellion which became apparent as early ad 1780, did those in parliament consider the issue of reform. Public pressure provided a fear of revolution, which was an entity which struck fear in the hearts of those in power because they did not want to follow the same route as the French and endanger the fundamental principles of the UK constitution. Popular pressure grew during times of economic hardship and therefore it could be argued that genuine public pressure was superficial and it was really a protest on an economic scale. Party politics was instrumental in the passing of legislation and popular pressure would often be second to that of personal or party gains. Popular pressure did even reduce the speed at which reform took place at certain times as Evans argues during the Chartist period. Reform was calculated by those in power to ensure that not only would the working man still be underrepresented in parliament, but also to ensure that their party would benefit from the reform. Therefore, the fact that the reforms were calculated shows that it was not simply a reaction to popular pressure and this could not be the main reason why reform bills were passed.
