Realism focuses on states acting in their own interest and defiant of moral consideration. Decisions states make are derived from human nature, which is deemed selfish and competitive. Realism assumes the international system is anarchic, that states are the biggest actors in the international structure (statism), and they are “black-boxed” into like-units when examined through the realism lens. Under anarchy, states must pursue a policy of self-help to ensure survival; under which states are rational actors and power-maximizers that live in constant fear and uncertainty. Hence, for their own security, sovereignty and survival, it is essential for states to amass resources, for power is represented through the economic, military, and political capabilities.
From this conflict, there are three viable outcomes for this issue, war, negotiated solution, and stalemate. War will most likely produce either a Chinese or Japanese acquisition. If China were to obtain the islands, it dictates a new stage of influence that China maintains in Asia. Conversely, Japanese acquirement infers that China is yet to be the dominate force. A compromise could also occur, perhaps with both sides reaping the benefits of the islands. Japan as of now has already “purchased” four of the islands from its alleged owner, while China has simply been expressing discontent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—creating a feeble image of the government and distressing popular sentiment in China (Buerk). A last outcome is a stalemate with neither side gaining control over the islands until a third party or new factor comes into play.
Realist theory seems to favor the option of going to war. With two sides in conflict over political power, self-help would edict war in order to protect the nation’s interest and security, ultimately increasing the chances of survival. In Machiavellian terms, this quarrel is justified by the need for gain, safety and reputation—winning the conflict will bring resources and political influence in the region which results in greater security. Similarly, Clausewitz agrees with the necessity of war, for he regards war as a political tool geared towards a political object. When all other political interactions fail to bring a satisfactory agreement, war remains as the final deciding factor.
Although realist dogmas gravitate toward war as the solution, the actual chances of war occurring is miniscule. Despite the assumption of selfish and competitive human nature guiding state policy, realists assume that states behave rationally. In this case, a war waged causes other parties, indubitably Taiwan and United States, to intervene. Under such circumstances, a rational state would recognize that war simply complicates relations further and devoting the state to fight such a war for relatively little gains is irrational. As a result, the implications of war will deter states from resorting to this possibility.
While states are characterized as self-interested and living in constant fear and uncertainty of other states, it does not remove the prospect of cooperation. Oye believes that under anarchy, states are willing to cooperate when mutual gains occur. States pursue relative gains and as rational actors, will cooperate for such advantages. Additionally, mutual gains and multiple iterations of interaction reduce the chances of defection due to reciprocal action. It is certainly feasible that China and Japan can reach a resolution where both sides benefit, yet historical interactions between the two sides have created a crevasse in their relations that greatly hinders such a possibility. Unless new benefits are brought onto the table, neither side would be willing to acquiesce.
Lastly, a stalemate is most expected as neither of the other options appeal to the rational state. The opportunity cost for war is thwarts any military action, while existing relations obstruct any inkling of cooperation. Ultimately, rationality overrides all other assumptions, be it selfish human nature, uncertainty, or the system of anarchy. Any rational state will always choose the best possible option. A stalemate of the current situation will persist until a new factor comes into play that pushes the other two options into a more appealing position.
Overall, realist attitude pushes for war and offers cooperation as a dubious alternative, but current settings mandate a stalemate with little effective options. This case can be generalized to other current conflicts such as the Dokdo Island under dispute by South Korea and Japan, or the Scarborough Shoal between China and the Philippines. In a way, it can even be referenced to the Israel-Palestine argument as a “who-was-here-first argument”. The same clash of interests and remedies generalize territorial disputes.
Works Cited
Buerk, Roland. "Could Disputed East China Sea Islands Be Sold?" BBC News. BBC, 19 Apr. 2012. Web. 02 Sept. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17766257>.
Hu, Sandra. "Taiwan Man Flubs Disputed Islands Protest with Flag Mix-Up." WSJ.com. N.p., 6 July 2012. Web. 02 Sept. 2012. <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/07/06/taiwan-man-flubs-disputed-island-protest-with-flag-mix-up/>.
"Japan Protests at Chinese Ships near Disputed Islands." BBC News. BBC, 07 Nov. 2012. Web. 02 Sept. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18792556>.
MarcU.S., Jonathan. "Island Disputes Reveal Asia's Evolving Powers." BBC News. BBC, 11 Mar. 2010. Web. 02 Sept. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11687880>.
"Q&A: China-Japan Islands Row." BBC News. BBC, 16 Aug. 2012. Web. 02 Sept. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139>.