The combined involvement of mass protests for democracy is able to alter the public's attitude towards popular protest, which they then recognize as an intrinsic aspect of democratic politics. The public's acceptance towards the value of protests is generally to be positive where pro-democracy movements actualized the liberalization of authoritarian rule and have habitually taken part in the democratization process. (Diamond and Plattner, 2001: 96)
Moreover, the democratization movement can evolve into new forms such as sectorial movements due to new opportunities conceived through democratic reforms during regime transitions, and could result in a plurality of groups coming into the broadening political field. (Diamond and Plattner, 2001: 97)
The institutionalization of pro-democracy movements unravels in many different ways, from a reduction in the prevalence of mass demonstrations, the involvement of contentious actors into politics by associating with opposition parties or creating new parties, to a persisting mobilization that actualizes through the transformation of the major vehicle of direct civic action. Therefore, the ascension of movements in various sectors resulting from the transition to democracy can be seen as surplus from the mass mobilization that allowed regime transition. (Diamond and Plattner, 2001: 98)
Mass Mobilization and Democratization in SK and Taiwan
To empirically support this paper’s perspective on the role of popular mobilization in democratization, it is necessary to compare the paths to democracy of South Korea and Taiwan.
In South Korea, a prodemocracy alliance of popular movements and opposition parties directed extensive demonstrations during the nascent phase of democratic transition. Since the demonstrations, the concerns that these assemblies associated with have been institutionalized in politics, on the one hand, and have been determined as authentic spheres of interest of civil society, on the other. However, Taiwan's progression to democracy has been led by ruling elites lacking extensive popular demonstrations, and advanced principally due to the party politics of the incumbent Kuomintang (KMT), at the same time with the opposition of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), until 2000, when the DPP succeeded in winning the presidential elections. (Jacobs, 2007: 231) Due to their similarities, a comparison of the two countries allows the ability to separate the role of mass mobilization, in the route to democracy. The comparison between South Korea and Taiwan will specifically aid in exploring how the collective memory and experience of creating democracy from below impacts public beliefs in regards to civic engagement and backing for a different political order.
In the analysis of the role of mass mobilization, it is asserted that mass mobilization during the short-term transition stage causes a preferential mindset among citizens towards direct civic activity in the ensuing progression of democratization and that this is in turn firmly affiliated with popular dedication to and support for democracy.
Empirical Analysis
South Korea and Taiwan each underwent divergent avenues to democracy after political liberalization. In Taiwan, the political opening resulted in the creation of the DPP and its contention with the KMT. The DPP recognized the current constitutional order and did not count on mass mobilization to enhance the democratization process. Several variations of social movements surfaced before political opening, however they did not share mutual goals and strategies, and did not depend on popular mobilization of demonstrations to aid the regime’s transition from authoritarianism. Specifically, the student movement in Taiwan was significantly weaker than in South Korea, mainly due to the KMT not loosening control of college campuses (Wright, 1999).
The transition to democracy in South Korea on the other hand, was extremely contentious. The deciding factor in Korean democratization was the notion that ordinary people took direct action in a revolutionary situation and pressured political reform from below. Chaeya groups and student movements guided the democratization movement and created a prodemocracy alliance with opposition rulers. The Chaeya groups were rejuvenated, due largely in part to the easing of authoritarian repression. The Chaeya surfaced as a consistent opposition force in the early 1970s when Park Chung-hee actualized the Yushin constitution, which dissolved direct presidential elections and ensured lifelong presidency. The Chaeya groups were withheld from political activity from 1980 to 1984, but post-liberalization, created an organization for nationwide movement for democratization, the National Movement Headquarters for a Democratic Constitution. The movement brought together student activists, opposition intellectuals, progressive religious leaders and dissident politicians. Newly replaced opposition politicians instantly created the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) and partook in the National Assembly elections of February 1985. The NKDP with the cooperation of the Chaeya groups, received 29.26% of the vote to the 35.25% of the ruling party. (Bedeski, 1994: 39). The outcome of the election necessitated that the Chun regime seek a strategy that encompassed discussion of constitutional revision with the NKDP.
The pressure from below climaxed in the June Uprising of 1987, where millions of university students and young professionals engaged in month long street protests. The main reason for uprising was the democratization movement contending the authoritarian regime for the revision of the constitution to allow for direct presidential elections, which brought unity to the various social forces in Korea.
Mass mobilization and democratic transition can also be demonstrated in comparing the labour movements of South Korea and Taiwan. With Taiwan, mobilization of the working class did not occur during democratization. This was because the industrial system in Taiwan consisted of small and medium enterprises, and because the KMT continued its corporate control on the working class regardless of liberalization. Therefore in regards to Taiwan’s democratization, workers only played a small role. (J. Chu, 1993; Y. W. Chu, 1996).
In contrast, the labour movement in Korea was heralded for its activity. This occurred because its industrial structure was more conducive for confrontational labour militancy at the factory stage. (Y. W. Chu, 1998; Koo, 2001; Buchanan and Nicholls, 2003). The structural circumstances for working class creation and its ability to mobilize in Korea was different from Taiwan. However, it is important to note that it was not until the June Uprising that the Korean labour movement flourished. Lower class workers were generally not present during the full-scale demonstrations for democracy. (Jacobs, 2007: 240) Also to keep in mind is that, the majority of labour disagreements in Taiwan were held in small and medium private enterprises containing a tiny amount of participants, and concluded without work stoppages. The KMT still continued to tightly control labour, even after democratic transition commenced. (Kim, Sunhyuk, 2009).
Mobilization of the Korean working class however, was much more assertive, resulting in significantly more working days lost because of strikes: 611.4 working days lost per thousand workers in 1989, when the working class was most organized, versus 1.6 days lost in Taiwan in 1993, when the working class density was highest. (Fan, Yun, 2004) The capacity for the working class to mobilize in both countries can be compared when observing the amount of workers associated with labour disputes. (Fan, Yun, 2004) A large contrast shows where Taiwanese workers were hesitant to partake in demonstrations during the whole democratization period, while the Korean labour movement effectively mobilized members during the transition stage of 1987-1989. In addition to obtaining organizational strength after the June Uprising, the Korean labour movement led the desire to foster pressure for more democratic reform. Starting with the Great Labour Struggle, the motivation for democracy changed from the student movement and Chaeya groups to the labour movement. The student movement swiftly broke into factions after the June Uprising, while the Chaeya groups were consumed into institutional politics, where exceptional revolutionaries were chosen by already established parties as candidates for the National Assembly elections of 1988 and 1992. (Kim, Sunhyuk, 2009)
Public attitudes
One of the important indicators of democratic consolidation is the support of the state’s citizenry for a democratic political structure. Without popular support for democracy as the political system of choice, it is difficult to maintain democracy. It is true if citizens share a collective memory of having actualized democracy by means of their popular persistence, for they will then see direct civic action to be an intrinsic aspect of democratic politics. The shared memory of citizen’s collective effort towards democratization will augment the amount of their commitment to the precise democracy in which they live. (Kim, Sunhyuk, 2009)
The divergence between the popular support for democracy in Korea and Taiwan is in line with survey data and time. In a comparative analysis of the 1996 Korean Democratization Survey and the 1995 Taiwanese General Social Survey on Social Change, Shin and Shyu (1997: 117-118) discovered that 91% of the Korean citizens were either fully committed or positively committed to democracy, while only 54% of Taiwanese provided such responses. Moreover, in the Asian Barometer Survey conducted in 2001-2003, 84.2% of Korean respondents stated that democracy was a suitable political system for their country, while only 59% of the Taiwanese respondents thought so. In regards to their regime preference, 17% of the Taiwanese people considered authoritarianism to be preferable to democracy, while only 10% of Korean respondents agreed with such a sentiment. (Shin and Wells, 2005; Chang et al, 2007).
Conclusion
In the analysis of the role of mass mobilization, it has been argued that mass mobilization during the short-term transition stage creates a sentiment in people that appeals to direct civic participation in the ensuing development of democratization and that this is also positively affiliated with popular obligation to and support for democracy.
In response to expanding political opportunities and institutional changes, the Korean democratization movement advanced into different types of social movements, conveying its mobilizing promise and democratic discord into different issues and actors. Also, the cumulative action of creating mass pressure for democracy can mold people’s mindsets concerned with demonstrations and strikes as a staple of democratic political life. Such popularity of direct civic participation in Korea appears to be tied to the public's confidence in democracy, which is generally not as strong in Taiwan. For that reason, the relationship between mass mobilization and the development of democracy can be recognized as mutually reinforcing in the long run.
From the issues presented in this paper, we can draw three implications for the study of comparative democratization. Generally mass movements do not positively advance democratization and possess outcomes such as that of Korea. Violent demonstrations can backfire and force an authoritarian regime to switch its trend toward democratization. To determine under what conditions mass mobilization plays a constructive role in advancing democracy, it is necessary to collect more systematic and comparative data on protest events and various civic organizations in societies.
Moreover, the authoritarian regimes of South Korea and Taiwan commenced political liberalization without the onset of a socioeconomic crisis. Variations in the opening of the political arena and in regime responses to mass protests in the initial phase of transition could lead to diverse patterns of mass mobilization on the path toward a full-fledged democracy. Thus, the interaction between mass pressure and regime response in the long-term trajectory of democratization is a topic that requires increased scholarly attention.
Lastly, the ties between political parties and mass movements over the course of democratization need to be analyzed in a broader context. The comparative study of South Korea and Taiwan presented in this paper provides some clues to the response to this intrinsic question. As the research has demonstrated, it is a topic that should be investigated in the future.
Works Cited
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