THE CIS: INDEPENDENCE IN A NEW WORLD ORDER
To some of the former republics of the USSR, the collapse of the Union came as a relief, to others a dis-orientating shock. The western republics such as the Ukraine and the Baltic states, were set firmly on the path toward European integration, the first step towards membership in the European Community. In addition to the dispute between Russia and the Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet, Kiev felt its relations with the Central Asian republics were more a burden than anything else, and that a continuing association with the CIS could well tie it to Asia forever. Therefore, the Ukraine, and perhaps Belorussia as well, move firmly towards Europe and away from the CIS, following many of the policies being pursued by Russia: integration into the global economy plus financial and technical assistance to move towards a market economy and a civil society. The much less developed Central Asian republics are turning toward their religious and ethnic cousins in the Turkish and Islamic worlds. Turkey, in particular has been interested in a strong presence in this area and devotes much diplomatic energy in pursuing the former Soviet republics in an attempt to pry them away from Russia . In June 1992, Turkey held a conference proposing a Black Sea zone of economic co-operation which included delegations from Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, multinational oil companies were attracted to the area to supply much needed investment to build up state structures in these semi- traditional societies. However, it must be recognised that for virtually all the former republics, questions of internal economic and civil order, as well as the relations with one another, either collectively or bilaterally, have been more important than foreign policy in the world outside of the CIS. These internal problems must be solved before these players can move, or operate, on the world stage.
It is for this very reason that an examination of the relations between the CIS members is in order. Concentrating on the most pressing problems facing this group of states: security, nationalism, and ethnicity.
THE INTERNAL FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY ISSUES OF THE CIS
After the treaty of Brest, concluded between the three Slavic states on 8 December 1991, the successor states of the USSR started to treat one another as foreign countries. Russia had no qualms about positioning itself as the legitimate successor to the Soviet Union and immediately
claimed the USSR’s seat on the UN Security Council, acquired all Soviet embassies, the Central Bank, and Soviet gold reserves, in the process. However, the issue which initially caused alarm among the successor states, and which has yet to be satisfactorily resolved, was the tendency to treat the common strategic armed forces as ‘de facto’ Russian armed forces. Since 80% of the officers are Russian, and given the extent of possible inter-ethnic disputes, many of the former republics regard the United Armed Forces to be a potential Russian interventionist force. Hence, the drive towards formalising the division of the armed forces and the setting-up of national guards. The recent settlement, giving the Russian Federation 50% of Soviet weaponry, with the rest being divided among the other CIS states proportionate to their influence, did not include the Black Sea Fleet or nuclear weapons. The persistent haggling between Ukraine and Russia over control of the powerful Black Sea fleet has emphasised the strategic importance of the Crimea and contributed to a deterioration in relations between the two strongest states in
the CIS.
However, it is the control and destruction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons which remains of vital importance, not only to Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan who all have strategic nuclear missiles on their soil; but to the West as well. In order to fulfil bilateral international commitments and prevent the proliferation of potential nuclear powers, Russia has patiently tried to regain control of all its nuclear weapons not withstanding the distrust of Kazakhstan and the Ukraine. These states regard nuclear weapons as useful bargaining levers and an effective deterrent against Russia, which has potential territorial claims against both Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In light of the sixteen million ethnic Russians living in these states, Russia believes it has legitimate security interests in protecting its foreign nationals and in preventing instability that could bring massive waves of refugees flooding over its borders. The Russian military also justifies its presence in nominally independent states by pointing to its perceived vital national interests: in protecting and securing strategic military bases, such as the Skrunda radar site in Latvia and, in denying outside powers access to previously secure border regions which might threaten Russia itself.
Therefore, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to the proliferation of nuclear control, the division of powerful armed forces into national units and the creation of dozens of potential ethnic flash points. Russia, the only state in the entire region with the ability to solve disputes and enforce solutions, teeters on the brink of social and economic collapse and is suspected by many of the successor states of harbouring imperialist ambitions.
PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY
One of the most serious and difficult questions confronting Russians today is not how they will survive economic reform but whether they legitimately can accept the independence of the other successor states. Because of the expansionist nature of both the czarist and communist state, its national consciousness has been centred on the empire and not on the Russian nation. “The Russians have never before been forced to define precisely who is a Russian and what the proper limits of Russian territory should be.”This attitude permeates all levels of Russian society and was aptly summed up by Galina Sidorava, an advisor to foreign secretary Kozyrev, when he remarked: “There is a psychological barrier preventing us from treating other CIS members as absolutely independent.”The loss of empire and superpower status is felt keenly by powerful sections of the old soviet military hierarchy, who, given the right circumstances, would attempt to re-establish Russian military hegemony over the old empire. However, many of the former republics are happy with the release of long suppressed patriotic feelings, and this has resulted in nationalist outbursts and assertive behaviour. While not dismissing the relevance, or importance, of national and ethnic strife in areas with no direct Russian interest; such as the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh involving Armenia and Azerbaijan; it will be the treatment of ethnic Russian minorities and the strength of ‘Great Russian Chauvinism’ which will be the final arbiter in the future stability and security of the CIS area.
Altogether, some twenty six million Russians live ‘abroad’ in other ex-Soviet republics. The relatively greater importance of nationality over citizenship in Soviet times convinces many of these Russians now living abroad that they in fact remain citizens of the USSR. Over half of the twenty six million Russians live in the Ukraine, where discrimination has not been a problem so far. However, in the Baltic states, huge Russian minorities are being progressively disenfranchised. In Central Asia, with a combined Russian population of over ten million, fear of resurgent Islam and civil war is causing a stampede from the region. In Georgia and Moldava, fighting is continuing involving secessionist movements and Russian minorities. In addition, the Russian parliament is questioning the legality of the transfer of the Crimea, where Russians form the clear majority, to Ukranian jurisdiction in 1954 and has called on Ukraine’s parliament to do the same. Leonid Kravchuk has denounced what he sees as ‘Russia’s imperialist disease’ and refused to discuss the matter. “Borders are increasingly seen as artificial, leading many to conclude that repression, aggression, or migration will eventually be the only option.”
As such tensions increase between states, they loom larger in Russia’s domestic politics. No government, especially the faction - ridden elites of Moscow, could be indifferent to the problems of so many of its people abroad. An increasing number of nationalist-minded Russians argue that the Russian government must make itself responsible for all Russians, wherever they live in the former USSR. Among these is Russia’s former vice-president, Alexander Rutskoi. In a television interview in 1992, he warned that: “Any state must be aware of the inevitability of punishment for what is perpetrated against Russian citizens.”Many powerful figures in the Russian military support these views and have already actively intervened in Georgia and Moldava. A policy of imposing spheres of influence, through military means, is being actively pursued. In the Baltic republics, the military wishes to protect ethnic Russians; in the Trans-Caucasian republics it claims to protect strategic bases on the Black Sea, while in Central Asia it is supposedly fighting Islamic fundamentalism. All of these measures are rationalised by the presence of Russian minorities and forcing the government on to the defensive, thus jeopardising the reforms and increasing the chances of a return to authoritarian rule. Territorial claims by Russia have already prompted Ukraine and Kazakhstan to hang on to their nuclear weapons. An increase in Russian chauvinism, in protecting its minorities, or a pronounced swing to the right in Moscow; could drive the new states to seek weapons systems or outside powers for allies, thus exacerbating an already precarious situation. Alternatively, the substantial non-Russian minority within the Russian federation (a fifth of the population) could be encouraged to rebel in defence of their ethnic cousins, or so goes the thinking of the day.
Therefore, it can clearly be seen that an aggressive Russian policy toward the new states would encourage them to militarise, to seek control over nuclear weapons, and to acquire outside allies, thus undermining Russia’s own security. The foreign policy makers of the successor states would have to realise that it is in their own interest to accommodate Russian interests and check any movement towards aggressive nationalism in their own states. “To recognise that Russians see themselves as having ‘lost’ while others have gained, and that this sense of loss will inevitably lead to rhetorical excesses that, given a responsible policy by others, will not lead to action.”To acknowledge that Russia remains the overwhelming power in the region, and has legitimate geopolitical concerns in many areas, would strengthen the hand of Moscows reform-minded liberals in these very difficult times and lead to a positive increase in security for all states.
CONCLUSIONS
At the moment, the situation in the CIS and Russia remains in a state of flux and transition. Events rather than deliberate policy continue to predominate and guide the process toward the form which Russia and its republics will eventually settle into. In many ways, foreign relations and security issues are governed by domestic necessity and shifting political alignments, which rapidly change and prompt frequent shifts in policy direction and a consequent reassessment of security strategy. However, since 1985, and the introduction of Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’, there has been a consistent foreign policy goal which has gradually subordinated all other considerations to its attainment: the integration into the community of civilised states in order to effect systemic change and regenerate the power of the USSR/CIS. Under the government of Boris Yeltsin this tendency became ever more pronounced. Its continuing success will determine whether reforming liberals within the context of Russian politics, will be able to solve the military, territorial and ethnic problems left over from the demise of the Soviet Union, peaceably. Russia is by far the most important and powerful state within the CIS. All other states will have to shape their foreign policy and security considerations according to this reality for many years to come. If Russia continues to receive adequate amounts of aid from the Western institutions, liberal reforms will continue; the nationalist hard-liners will be slowly isolated and their power bases eroded. The settlement of border disputes and the protection of Russian minorities can be achieved through the provisions of the CSCE under the
auspices of the UN. The reduction of tension in the area would allow Russia and the other successor states to further concentrate on domestic reforms, bilateral treaties, and a new community organised in accordance with regional conditions. A community and bilateral
treaty network that is based on co-operation not coercion. Therefore, we must conclude that the paramount issue in foreign policy and security confronting Russia and the CIS is continued integration into the ‘civilised community of nations’ as the best means of peaceably solving
national disputes, ethnic strife, and arresting economic decline.
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