Pakistan's Democracy: Democratic Institutions

Pakistan’s Democracy: Democratic Institutions

By: Iqbal ibn Saleem Akhtar

Executive Summary

The current situation in Pakistan as it stands is that the current leader, President Pervez Musharraf, took over the country in a bloodless coup in October 1999. The nation has yet to see a stable democracy and over half of the nation’s history has been under the rule of military. How can this be explained and what institutional mechanisms are necessary for Pakistan to survive as a democracy? What current institutional structures can be used to facilitate predictable change of power?

My argument is simple, the political institutions that Pakistan was given were inadequate for the creation a stable democracy, and without the cohesion and dissemination of a concrete Pakistani identity and civil society the democracy defaulted to the control of the only stable institutional structures- the military and civil bureaucracies. I will later explicate and substantiate this thesis with political history and public policy decisions by lawmakers throughout Pakistan’s history.

The military regimes of Pakistan have created an alternative governmental structure that is robust to external and internal threats, however greatly influenced at the basic level of economic stability on foreign powers. The partition of Pakistan in 1971 has introduced the new element of Islamization, which has greatly influenced the political arena. The concept of federalism introduced needs a major overhaul to be solvent in the future. One of the only ways the Pakistani political-national identity has been solidified is weakly through the unity around the religion Islam and in a more concrete and major way is the enmity towards India. Major internal challenges include public accountability, economic decline, poverty increase, unsustainable development, fragile political system and dysfunctional public services. Major external challenges include globalization, IT revolution and lastly the focus of the paper- democratic governance.

The possible institutional changes would be through education of the citizenry, eradiation of corruption, and an unbiased system of more representative hiring in government agencies in the long term. In the short term a codification of informal institutional and a power sharing among formal institutional structures with checks and balances to prevent overriding. For example in the paper I will explain about using the religious clergy (ulema) as a check and consultative arm of Congress. Also recommendations will be proposed for completing of the system of devolution started by President Musharraf, and renegotiating the power and spheres of state and local governments in relation to the national government. These are not concrete suggestions, but more like theoretical necessities for the progress of the Pakistani State.

Pakistani Political Institutions

The Partition of British Colonial India into Pakistan and India had very devastating effects for Pakistan, more so than India. The crisis in Kashmir, the birth of the nation with an arch-rival at the boarder and the ideological vacuums left by the death of Quaid-i-Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan have all contributed in some way to the dominance of the military in domestic politics and the weakening of nascent democratic institutions in Pakistan. But the military has played a very central and positive role in keeping Pakistan solvent as a nation for its history, and in the future a more formal power-sharing agreement must be reached to allow democratic institutions to exist while the nation can continue to be protected by the military in the national interest of security. There are two distinct phases of democratic intuitional disruption and disintegration, the first state (1947-1958) deals with the issues regarding the creation of Pakistan and inequalities of Partition; the second phase (1958-present) develops upon the first but new factors help to hasten the disintegration of democratic politics and institutions. This paper will begin with an explanation of the democratic institutions and disintegration, the current political regime of Musharraf, and finally provide suggestions for strengthening political democratic institutions and a return to democracy.

The preamble to the 1973 Pakistani constitution clearly states, “that Pakistan would be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of justice” and where the “principle of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed.” The constitution sets up a federal system within a Parliamentary democracy. The Federal government should have a two-tiered system of the central authority and provincial governments. The bodies within the federal system consist of the Majlis As-Shoora (Parliment), the President, and an independent Judiciary consisting ultimately of a Supreme Court and a Federal Shariat Court. The role of the military in all this is “to defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so.” Also the military in theory should not only be acting in aid of the civil power, but also the President should have the power to “raise and maintain the military”, “grant commissions in the forces”, and “appoint Chairmen…and determine their salaries.” So technically by every definition in the constitution, the military should not be leading the government nor seize power in a coup. Why is this not case and why have the military seized power four times (’58, ’69, ’77 and ‘99) in Pakistan’s 55-year history? This goes to heart of many problems with the very institutions inherited in Partition, the lack of a robust design, foreign intervention and support, elite control, half-successful nationalism, regional inequalities and representation as well as unequal resource collection and allocation.

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The Partition (1947) and creation of the nation of Pakistan had from its onset created tension between India and Pakistan because of the unequal division of land, military, industry and capital. Were it not for Gandhi’s push to give Pakistan its due share of 15 crore rupees, even that capital would not have been given to Pakistan. For instance, the issue of Kashmir and refusal to give the allocated army units from the British Indian army to create the Pakistani national army is only one example of how Pakistan started at an unequal footing in terms of land, capital and military strength. Another major setback was the fact that all the major industry was located in India, and the new nation of Pakistan was namely an agricultural economy dominated by feudal jagirdars (landowners) did not help the situation. Almost all political democratic institutions were left in India and the war of ’48 immediately plunged the nation into conflict showing the necessity of the military for the national defense. The death of Quaid-i-Azam, premature demise of Liaqat Ali Khan, and the barely adequate leadership thereafter brought about the first military coup in ’58 by Ayub Khan. The events subsequent to this first coup then complicate matter and bring into the scheme complications of the democratic institutions. However, from the time of Partition to the first coup the major inequalities that Pakistan was born with, including the alliances Quaid-i-Azam made with the feudal lords and ulemah, as well as the premature death of Quaid-i-Azam led to the ideological weakening of democratic institutions and the dissolution of Quaid’s vision of a secular democratic state. This is the first phase of weakening the democratic institutions of Pakistan.

Another part of this first phase of the weakening of the democratic institutions was the very design of it. From a political science standpoint the parliamentary system has its own checks and balances in the form of coalition formation and directly through the electorate of parties as seen with the Israeli system. The flaw does not exist necessarily because of the Parliamentary system contrary to the view of Sohail Mahmood. For the Parliamentary system can itself actually be a more fair representation of the populous than the Presidential system. The 1st flaw exists in the very uneven system of checks and balances, the branches of government do not have equal power, checks and balances are virtually non-existent, and there is no separate body to mediate conflict between the differing branches (President [Executive] and Legislative), i.e. a respected, accepted and impartial Supreme Court. “The army remained in a position of ‘oversight’, mediating between the holders of overt power, and the Prime Minister and President both remained dependent on the support of the military to stay in power.” The 2nd flaw exists in the very bargaining process, there are only two major contenders of power in the national elections- The Pakistani Muslim League (PML) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and these parties are basically controlled by the 99 powerful families of Pakistan that own approximately 70% of the nation’s wealth. There is no real bargaining or competition in the sense of electoral shifts and voting changes. The very checks needed to have a functioning Parliamentary democracy does not exist, instead only elite and corrupt politics prevail without any check, save the military in times of crisis.

The second phase has a few parts, which led to the continued denigration of the democratic institutions in Pakistan post ’58. The first of the second phase is nationalism and faith in government. Especially after the ’71 civil war, faith in institutions has been steadily declining and the civil society and civic values need for the creation of an electorate needed for a functioning democracy does not exist because nationalism has not been fully defined. The first major contributing factor was the lack of complete civil nationalism; this is nationalism as a democratic institution. Indian and Pakistani nationalism as with the idea of the culture, and those within these boundaries, is based on the idea of us-them and the concept of the other. Currently in the United States, other facets to nationalism have been able to avoid the denigration and negation of another to form a national identity. In Pakistan and India the very concepts of their respective nationalisms (after partition) emerged largely in opposition to the other and subsequent demonization of the other, which shows the lack of positive definitions of nationalism. The necessity in the South Asian case is that nationalism as an ideology has not completely taken hold as people as they are competing between different identities and this competition creates conflict and chaos. A perfect example of successful nationalism is the present US case, where the pluralistic society celebrates cultural differences and encourages freedom of expression but within the unifying concept of American nationalism, however that it is defined. An objection can be raised that in the American case or even the European case, the amount of bloodshed and the fact that two world wars needed to be fought to create the now harmonious nationalist societies shows the destructive force that nationalism has had as an ideology. The response to that is twofold. First even in the emergence of American nationalism the necessity did not exist for another to be demonized as an integral part of defining American nationalism, therefore no eternal conflict was or is necessary as a definition of being an American. Secondly, the mistakes of the Europeans and Americans need not be repeated by not only learning from history, but also re-defining nationalism in other terms other than Western nationalism. Nationalism need not go the same path nor be defined in the same secular sense as Western nationalism, but in the end at least still mimic the harmony and plurality of Western society over the last 50 years. This is where moderate Islam can meet nationalism as outlined by Musharraf that “Pakistan is a moderate Muslim country.” Also the lack of good governance has contributed to the lack of faith in formal governmental political and economic institutions and the creation of parallel informal institutions such as informal bribery to achieve a basic order of law in certain parts of the country (such as NWFP) and the alternative black market system.

The second part of this decline comes form the foreign intervention of the US and support of Pakistan during the Cold War and currently with the 9/11 coalition. The unconditional US support of Pakistani leadership even through the military coups have in many ways contributed to the length of the regimes as the money and military support have come from the US. These external factors of international pressure and support from the US and the external threat of India have helped to continue the cycle of democracy and military coups in Pakistan.

The third part of the second phase of the disintegration of the democratic institutions is both regional inequalities and unequal resource allocation. The definition of a just government in terms of resource allocation comes from Rawls, “Social and economic inequalities arranged in such an order such that both:

Greatest benefit to least advantaged
Offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”

The regional inequalities and the disproportional budget that goes to the military has in fact exacerbated the decline of the democratic institutions. This reference is directly in reference to the 90s democratic rule of Pakistan by Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. An example of regional inequalities is the overwhelming development and in the province of Punjab and representation of Punjab at the expense of other regions of Pakistan. During the time of democratic politics not only was corruption widespread but it was concentrated at the heart of the democratic institutions, for instance during the rule of Nawaz Sharif, it is estimated that he accumulated in corruption the entire GDP of Pakistan of one year. This also goes for Benazir Bhutto, during her rule her husband siphoned off from all construction and development projects 10-50% off each contract issued by the government. In addition, the political repression of political opponents during the recent democratic rule was also very harsh. The resource allocation problem can be seen most vividly in seeing the infrastructure development of Punjab versus Balochistan. The democratic regimes ad interim during the second phase have not been able to give the greatest benefit to least advantaged nor allow equality in opportunity, and because of the aforementioned flaws in the system democratic rule in Pakistan has actually exacerbated the income disparities between the rich and the poor. Pakistani democratically elected leaders and institutions have not fulfilled the simple requirement of a just institution. The problems of Pakistan’s democracy can be explained ad infinitum, however I have attempted to give a general outline of the democratic institutional failings and have provided specific instances and details to explain these problems.

The Current Musharraf Regime

General Pervez Musharraf took the reigns of government on October 12, 1999. Musharraf asserted that he had “taken action to remedy the fast-declining situation” of the country in which institutions had been destroyed, the economy was nearing collapse, and “self-serving” policies of civilian leaders had “rocked the very foundation” of the state. The democratic institutional justification that Musharraf gave for his takeover (and an adequate explanation of the state of democratic institutions) is that “corruption pervades all three branches of government: the executive, legislative and judiciary. The result is that none of the three branches act as a check upon the other two.” Musharraf declared a state of emergency, assumed the office of the Chief Executive, dissolved the Parliament, and in the summer of 2001 declared himself President. In terms of democracy he stated, “this is not martial law, only another path towards democracy.” This Musharraf regime has a very bold perspective in changing the nation to become a self-governing democracy; however, his plans also have their opponents.

Constable gives a very interesting view of the democratic failure of Pakistan and the emergence of President Musharraf, those reasons are: feudal land lords, large and privileged military, the large black-market economy, the corrupt bureaucracy, political power used for private gain and the increasing tide of Islamic fundamentalism (General-Mullah alliance). Musharraf has publicly outlined many of the ways he wishes to get democracy and democratic institutions in place in Pakistan, the two I will concentrate on is the tax-loan plan and the devolution plan.

The reason for the tax-loan plan is to get Pakistan sufficiently able to create economic growth and prevent the nation from defaulting on loans. By keeping Pakistan economically solvent, the democratic institutions can be self-sustaining. The tax part of the plan is to collect taxes from the people of Pakistan. Out of a population of 135 million, only about 1 million people paid any taxes before Musharraf came to power. The new regime has been very active about going aggressively collecting taxes by sending soldiers to businesses and homes to keep tax revenues flowing. The government has levied new taxes on the wealthiest citizens and has fired corrupt revenue collection agents. The second part of this initiative has been to crackdown on loan defaulters. Corrupt state banks have irresponsibly lent out loans to businesses that have not been paid back to the government. It is estimated by Standard and Poors that Pakistan is indebted at a rate of 120% of its GDP. Musharraf has made very impressive gains in the beginning of the emergency, the more entrenched interests are harder for him to remove as now Musharraf is bound by international opinion, the US 9/11 alliance and also the jihadi groups within Pakistan have also created constraints.

The second and more direct plan to restore democracy that Musharraf outlined is the devolution plan. This is directed at allowing more Pakistanis to engage in the political system by making it more responsive to the needs of the people and directing policy from the local to the national level, ie. this is a way to more accurately aggregate communal preferences and create policies from those necessities. This plan has a few parts. The first part is the separation of administrative functions, eliminate conflicts of interests by barring politicians from private business, an overhaul of the voter-registration system and giving real power to local representatives. The second part is the creation of the divisional and deputy commissioners that have been operating since the time of the British Raj. This is a three-tiered system of power distribution, which gives more power to local officials. At the base, the union councils will be directly elected form the village level. The union council members elect a Union Nazim to serve as a mayor in the village. The deputy Nazims serve as a council creating the next level of the “Tehsil”. From the tehsil (electoral college) District Nazims are selected are to have the same responsibilities as the Deputy Commissioner under the old system, and the districts are to be reevaluated and re-distributed with each district to be of an average size of 1.5 million people. These reforms have yet to be implemented as the votes for the Nazims were fraught with irregularities.

Recently (April 30, 2002) an overwhelming “yes”, to the referendum that would allow would President Musharraf to extend his presidency for five years overriding the scheduled presidential election scheduled for October, has passed. This referendum has been seen by outsiders as a mock attempt at democracy citing the numerous irregularities, but has for now secured President Musharraf for another five years in office, delaying democratic elections for the time being. These new initiatives and actions by the President are known by his terminology as guided democracy.

Possible Solutions

The problems of democratic governance are numerous for the Pakistan as with most developing countries. The answers to these problems from academics, diplomats and lay-people are equally numerous. I have chosen a few policy recommendations that would help to create a theoretically more stable democratic political institutions and to facilitate a transition to democracy. I will put these recommendations into broad based ideological changes or suggestions that can have very many specific implementation methods.

The Judiciary must go through a very comprehensive reform to not only make it more equitable to all in terms of the decisions, but also to insulate it from political changes in the governance arena.
Establish a truly independent election commission and bring elections to all parts of the country. This includes curbing election fraud, revamping the electoral commission, etc..
Reform of parliament and political parties. One of the major problems is that existing political parties do not allow a proper democracy to develop, because there is no shifting pluralities to allow the electorate to keep elected officials in check. Allow more power in the hands of the citizenry, not in the vested interests of political elites.
Institutional reform and checks and balances. Create a more formal role for the military analogous to the Turkish setup. Allow the Ulemah to become a consultative branch of the legislature and create competing interests to allow competition and self-regulation and enforceability as well as making the legislative, executive and judicial branches robust to internal and external threats.

In conclusion, the problems that Pakistan is facing in terms of the ad interim democracies and military coups come from a various number of reasons and inequalities that have compounded to create an almost predictable cycle of military coups from the democratic governments. This comes in part from the military’s role as protector of the State. However the military is not as capable of governing the nation, and the democratic institutional disintegration must be halted to keep the civil liberties of Pakistani citizens intact. The general broad recommendations are above; however, a point to be made is this. If the people are not educated and inculcated in to the mindset of a democratic electorate and do not uphold the values and institutions, then it does not matter how great a theoretical model of governance that can be created, it will not be implemented or followed completely. And this is a bigger danger of a pseudo democracy-dictatorship as no institution has proper control and it becomes easy for demagogues and political entrepreneurs to seize power and destroy the nation. The key for democracy and the strengthening of democratic institutions in Pakistan is simply education not just literacy, with education people can create their own nation and eventually Pakistan will become a developed nation of solvent institutions and become a powerful economic power to be truly independent.

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