Explain why Chamberlain adopted a policy of appeasement
Explain why Chamberlain adopted a policy of appeasement Nowadays, the word appeasement can mean ‘giving in’, but in fact in the 1930’s, it actually meant ‘negotiation’, and that was what Chamberlain, the then British prime minister, decided to adopt once he realised ‘collective security’ was failing. People saw his policy as giving in to demands, but in fact, he was purely negotiating with Hitler, and he had many reasons to do so. One of which includes the fact that Britain was still weak after World War 1 in terms of armament. If they were to go to war, Britain wouldn’t be ready, so Chamberlain needed to buy time to re-arm in case war did occur. In WW1 Britain received the help from many thousands of soldiers from their empire and over sea colonies. This time however Britain had all but lost it's over sea powers and had very little support to rely on. But it wasn't only Britain's over sea colonies that wouldn't fight; France wanted peace and wanted to avoid war at all costs. Chamberlain gave in to some of Hitler’s demands, as going to war against the strong Germany was not a good idea for Britain. The use of German bombers in The Spanish Civil War worried Chamberlain, as he realised the amount of destruction they could cause if they were to be used in Britain due to a war. Another reason was that WW1 was still very much at the forefront of many
"Chamberlain's appeasement was not a feeble policy of surrender and unlimited retreat. Chamberlain thought that war was futile and rejected it but never followed peace at any price."
"Chamberlain's appeasement was not a feeble policy of surrender and unlimited retreat. Chamberlain thought that war was futile and rejected it but never followed peace at any price." [R.A.C Parker, an academic historian specialising in foreign policy in a book called Chamberlain and Appeasement (1993)] How valid is that interpretation of Chamberlain's appeasement? In the late 1930s, Hitler became very demanding and kept pushing for more from the countries who were domineering in Europe. He was pushing further for his dream of achieving 'lebensraum' and he was manipulating the other European countries and taking whatever opportunity he could to turn them against each other and form stronger ties with them to safeguard his idealistic dreams and plans for Germany. Chamberlain worked very hard to appease Hitler and to try to keep other countries happy without attracting hostility to anyone. He was a kind of 'go between' all of the other countries as he had to keep all relations fairly relaxed between them. However, he did not see Hitler as too much of an enemy and underestimated what lengths Hitler would go to in order to get his way, and he did not have the insight we have today into Hitler's ideas. Chamberlain would have only seen Hitler as someone who wanted the lost land of the Treaty of Versailles back and to make his country prosperous. He could not see Hitler's
Assess the Argument that the Chamberlain Government engaged in the Policy of Appeasement because of Britain's Economic Weakness.
Assess the Argument that the Chamberlain Government engaged in the Policy of Appeasement because of Britain's Economic Weakness. The policy of appeasement that was pursued in the years immediately preceding the Second World War will always be an issue of controversy and heated historical debate. The main aim of appeasement, as pursued under Chamberlain, was to avoid another devastating war in Europe. This meant negotiation and compromise with the Third Reich, and the belief that war was never inevitable and too costly an enterprise to be entered into until all alternative, viable measures had been exhausted. With the gift of hindsight we know that ultimately the policy failed and as such the appeasers have been heavily criticised, most famously by 'Cato' in the 'Guilty Men' of 1940 and by Winston Churchill in his war memoirs. Such criticisms remain heavily influential today and contemporary governments still use the example of appeasement in order to justify military action against regimes that have comparative similarities with the Third Reich, as with Iraq. However, within the academic world the debate surrounding appeasement is being revised constantly. In the 1960s many writers came to view the efforts taken by the Chamberlain administration to avoid war as highly reasonable and even necessary. Today the debate continues and the revisionist school is coming under revision
Book Review The Scramble For Africa, M.E Chamberlain.
Lee Roxburgh Book Review The Scramble For Africa, M.E Chamberlain. Chamberlain, M,E. The Scramble For Africa. 2nd ed. (Longman. Harlow. 1999). This is the second edition of M.E Chamberlain's The Scramble for Africa, originally published in 1974, as part of the 'Seminar Studies in History Series'. Becoming a popular book for undergraduate courses, it is probably best described as a textbook, as the main text is supported by primary sources in the final section of the book (the documents section). The book's format is comprised of four parts. The first, describes the background to how Europeans have viewed Africa, particularly the Victorian image. The second, analyses the scramble on a regional basis, starting with the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, and ending with Fashoda and the Anglo French agreements of 1904. The third is a conclusion, providing an overview of academic theories regarding the subject, including the views of academics such as J.A Hobson, and Robinson and Gallagher. With the final part being a collection of documents that are referred to in the main body of the text. The author, M.E Chamberlain, is professor Emerita, University of Wales, Swansea. Her other works include Decolonisation: The Fall of the European Empires, and Britain and India: The Interaction of Two Peoples. The partition of Africa (scramble) and New Imperialism is an area of history
Why did Chamberlain sign the MunichAgreement on September 30th 1938?
Why did Chamberlain sign the Munich Agreement on September 30th 1938? There are two possible explanations of why Chamberlain signed the Munich Agreement. The first is that Chamberlain was misguided and naive; he believed that Hitler would keep to the agreement. Therefore he believed that he was the saviour of Europe and had stopped them from going to war. As soon as the crisis over the Sudetenland began Chamberlain immediately started negotiating with Hitler from the 15th September. Chamberlain visited Hitler on three separate occasions, this shows that he was desperate to negotiate. The first Chamberlain made was on the 15th September at Berchtesgaden. Chamberlain met Hitler and offered him the Sudetenland. However Hitler did not fully believe Chamberlain's intent to carry this out. Seven days later again, this time at Godesberg, Hitler demanded immediate occupation of Sudetenland, the reason for doing so is because Hitler needed a quick decisive war, to boost morale. This time there was deadlock in the negotiations, however Hitler did promise not to act until 1st October. But then British public opinion had changed, in favour of a new tougher approach, to stand up to Hitler, so preparations were made for war - 44 Anti-Aircraft guns were prepared, 3.8million gas masks were distributed, trenches and shelters were dug in Hyde Park. And so Hitler's bluff was called - GB and
Why did Chamberlain appease Hitler at Munich and was he justified?
Why did Chamberlain appease Hitler at Munich and was he justified? While both Chamberlain and Deladier weren't particularly worried by Hitler's reunion with Austria, seeing it as a reversal of some of the injustice caused by the Treat of Versailles, Benes, the leader of Czechoslovakia, was rather appalled. He sought confirmation from Britain and France that they would stand up to Hitler if he ever invaded Czechoslovakia. The French reluctantly agreed, and having asked Hitler whether he would ever invade Czechoslovakia, Britain too agreed, reassured by his promise. When Hitler did decide he would take some parts of the Sudetenland, he satisfied Chamberlain by explaining that he was only interested in a small amount of land in order to help the German people who were being suppressed there. Four days later, on the 19th of September 1938, Hitler increased his demands, and said that he wanted the whole of the Sudetenland. With Mussolini's help, Britain, France, Italy and Germany held a final meeting in Munich on 29th September to decide the fate of the Sudetenland. This was done without consulting the Czechs or Russia. The Munich Peace Agreement was eventually signed, and Chamberlain came back to Britain with the "Peace of Paper" which indicated the "desire [of Britain and Germany] never to go to war with one another again." In the agreement, the whole of the Sudetenland had
How fair is Louise Shaw's Interpretation on Chamberlain? The interpretation revolves around the idea that a pact between Britain and the Soviet Union could have been a turning point in stopping or discouraging Hitler
Transfer-Encoding: chunked Many different interpretations were given throughout modern history on Chaimberlain’s policy of appeasement between 1937 - 1938 where Nazi Germany’s expansionist ideologies were allowed. Interpretation A expresses an Academic counter-revisionist view point. As the policy of appeasement failed to prevent war, those who advocated it were quickly criticised. The public opinion was strongly opposed to war, anything was to be done so that the outcome and losses suffered in World War One were not reproduced. This piece of writing will attempt to determine how fair Interpretation A is on former prime minister Neville Chamberlain. Interpretation A is a an extract from the writing of British historian Louise Shaw written in 1987. The interpretation revolves around the idea that a pact between Britain and the Soviet Union could have been a turning point in stopping or ‘discouraging’ Hitler’s expansionist ideologies, however, Chaimberlain’s fear of communism (‘anti-Bolshevik prejudice’) made sure that such an alliance was not formed. To a certain extent this source is correct. It indicates that if Hitler had faced a more aggressive and coordinated response at the time of appeasement, he would not have gained territory or resources. This seems to be corroborated by the failed attempt by Hitler to invade Austria in 1934; Mussolini, in line
Why did Chamberlain sign the Munich Agreement on September 30th 1938
Why did Chamberlain sign the Munich Agreement on September 30th 1938? There are many reasons Chamberlain signed the Munich Agreement in 1938. There were many ideological reasons and some pragmatic. Some also believe Chamberlain was being naïve when he signed the agreement. The obvious reason the agreement was signed was because it was a part of appeasement. An ideological reason was that he wanted to avoid war at all costs, and did the rest of Europe. This reason is most likely due to Chamberlain's 'trusting nature' as he thought Hitler would stick to his word and not ask for anything else. Mussolini had also convinced Chamberlain before the meeting that he had to stop another world war from breaking out. Another reason he may have signed the contract was because he wanted peace and he thought it was more important than Czechoslovakia so this was another ideological reason. However this could link to pragmatic reason as Chamberlain may have believed that it was not possible to save Czechoslovakia which means the only reason he gave them up is because he knew he could not win. We see evidence of this in conferences they had, Eduard Benes hardly had any say in the matter. There may be another pragmatic reason for the signing. Before the meeting in Munich, Chamberlain was told by the head of the Britain's armed forces to check if they were ready for war and he told him that
Why did Chamberlain sign the Munich Agreement on September 30th 1938?
Why did Chamberlain sign the Munich Agreement on September 30th 1938? In 1938 most British politicians and the public still believed in a policy of appeasement to avoid war with Germany. There was still also a strong pacifist feeling and many people did not want a repeat of the First World War, as they had lost many close relatives. The Oxford Union debate in 1935; showed most of the public favoured disarmament, which meant they thought war wasn't an option. Also the British people wanted more money and resources spent on social welfare, which meant improving the standard of living, and if Chamberlain had decided to go to war in 1938, he would have looked very foolish because he would have gone against public opinion, his own foreign policy and other members of parliament. Britain was losing its grip on its empire and it wanted to preserve it. The British military was everywhere and therefore it was a long way away from home. Britain couldn't really afford another war, as it was stilling paying debts to the USA and was still recovering from the Wall Street Crash, as well the Great Depression. Many people still had sympathy for Germany because they felt the Versailles Treaty was very harsh and that Hitler should be allowed to take back certain areas such as the Sudetanland and the Rhineland, which had a lot of Germans living in them. Also the German army had been limited and
Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet (1971), p. 9. In this extract Colvin talks of the effect that the Public Records Act of 1967 will have on the view of the actions of the Chamberlain government, and Chamberlain himself, in the lead up to war.
4. I. Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet (1971), p. 9. In this extract Colvin talks of the effect that the Public Records Act of 1967 will have on the view of the actions of the Chamberlain government, and Chamberlain himself, in the lead up to war. When he talks of those the advantage of "human memory" he is talking about himself, as Colvin had been a Journalist for the News Chronicle reporting from Berlin in the lead up to the war. Colvin believes that these papers will be of particular interest to those who experienced these events, as it will give a fuller picture of the events to these people. Those who have the benefit of "human memory", Colvin believes, have an advantage over the later historians who will study these papers, as they could not have as good an understanding of the events as they have not experienced them first hand. Although Colvin does not mention how this experience can cloud the vision of a critical analysis of the Chamberlain government. In The Chamberlain Cabinet, Colvin uses the 1967 act to confirm the orthodox view of Chamberlain and appeasement that had been put forward by Cato and many others. Namely, that appeasement was a misguided policy. Colvin believes that Czechoslovakia should never have been surrendered to Germany and that the government failed to rearm in time. He also accuses Chamberlain of being an
